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Even an idealist philosopher like Immanuel Kant (1795) considered war to be the natural 
state of man. In that respect, he shared the perspective of the English philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes (1651). According to Hobbes, the state of nature was characterised by anarchy 
akin to perpetual war
1
; each man taking what he could with no basis for right or wrong. 
Life was: “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. Consequently, it was in the interest of 
individuals to surrender their individual freedom of action to an absolute ruler in return 
for personal security and rule based interactions in society. Kant was concerned more 
with preventing war between nations. That would require the simultaneous adoption of a 
republican constitution by all nations, which inter alia would check the war-like 
tendencies of both monarchs and the citizenry; the cosmopolitanism that would emerge 
among the comity of nations would preclude war, implying a confederation amongst such 
nation states (foedus pacificum).
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 Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism is also applicable 
within nation states. Both thinkers were concerned with mechanisms that would engender 
peace. In other words, peace has to be achieved through deliberate design; this is what 
Galtung (1964) described as the negative peace (the absence of war).  
 
Within nation states, civil war is only one manifestation of large scale violent conflict. It 
is important to emphasize that civil ‘war’ involves the direct participation of the state, 
and military style confrontations. Since the end of the cold war, conflict research has 
been dominated by the study of civil war in developing countries and in the former Soviet 
bloc. This discourse on the nature of civil war has gradually evolved into a discussion of 
development or state failure, depending upon the disciplinary or political stance of the 
interlocutors.
3
 Along, with this there has been a growing proclivity on the part of Western 
governments and international organisations to become directly involved in conflict 
affected developing countries after the demise of the cold war, and the associated 
undermining of Westphalian state sovereignty.    
 
The number of armed conflicts peaked in 1991 when 52 wars occurred in 38 countries, 
but by 2007, this number declined to 34 wars in 25 countries (Gleditsch, 2008). Along 
with this, associated conflict fatalities are also declining. However, the number of 
Muslim countries experiencing civil war as a proportion of all civil wars is rising. Civil 
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 Bellum omnium contra omnes, or war by all against all.    
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 Arguably, the ideal behind the European Union is in the spirit of Kant’s thinking.  
3
 The term state failure is more often employed in strategic studies, and development failure in conflict 
studies and other social sciences dealing with developing countries.  
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(and inter-state) war incidence is on the wane, but other forms of violent conflict may be 
rising, and these do not always involve the state as a direct participant.  
 
For example, violence associated with democratic transitions in many parts of the 
developing world is still rife. It has been found that the risk of conflict is higher during 
transitions between an autocratic to a democratic system and vice versa than in long-
standing and established autocracies or democracies (Hegre et. Al, 2001). Although there 
has been a marked shift towards democracy in most developing countries since the end of 
the cold war, and most have adopted the multi-party electoral system to form 
governments, but they still lack adequate constraints on the executive and their electoral 
systems are fraught with imperfections, making them anocracies rather than democracies. 
An anocracy
4
 has characteristics of both democracy and autocracy; most developing 
countries fall into this category, raising conflict risk.   
 
Secondly, the losers from increased globalization which widens the gulf between the 
‘haves and have nots’ sometimes transform their protests into violent insurgencies. Rapid 
globalization, especially in the form of increased international trade and inward foreign 
investment has increased income differences between skilled and unskilled workers all 
over the world (Mamoon and Murshed, 2008), and income inequality generally 
(Milanovic, 2011). In many developing societies, rural hinterlands have been particularly 
disadvantaged; where it is combined with ethnic differences with the majority of the 
state’s population, this relative backwardness can constitute a recipe for violent (Maoist 
style) insurgencies. Recent increases in food and fuel prices, coupled with real resources 
devoted to debt servicing present new vulnerabilities. The important point is that such 
relative deprivation can take place even when the nation’s aggregate economic 
performance is impressive, and growth is both positive and buoyant. Thirdly, there are 
ethnic or communal conflicts where groups compete over dwindling resources, such as 
those utilised in agriculture (Homer-Dixon, 1999) or other contestable endowments like 
land. Many of these ethnic conflicts do not include the state as a direct participant.  
 
Contemporary violent internal conflict does not always take the form of civil war; it can 
be associated with both developmental success and failure, the latter is often referred to 
as state failure. Mass protest and communal strife are becoming increasingly important 
forms of developing country internal conflict. Thus, even in successful developing 
countries and emerging market economies, such as in India, globalization and growth can 
lead to new forms of conflict. Furthermore, democracy does not serve as a panacea for 
conflict prevention.  
 
The rest of this work is organised as follows. Section 2 contains an outline of new forms 
of vulnerability and an integrated theory of conflict and ’development’. Section 3 
presents a sketch of the relationships between natural resources and conflict or 
cooperation. The salience of the local nature of new types of conflict is described in 
section 4, with section 5 outlining issues in sectarian (communal) and cultural conflict 
based on ethnic difference. Finally, section 6 is by way of conclusion.      
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2 Conflict and Underdevelopment/Development 
 
Organized large scale conflict in developing countries is nowadays almost universally 
regarded to lead to human development failure, the perpetuation of poverty and human 
insecurity, all of which enhance the risk of failed states. Equally, endemic poverty and 
state failure also enhances the risk of civil war and conflict. Therefore, the developmental 
goal of poverty reduction requires conflict prevention. Furthermore, conflict (even in 
distant lands) undermines international security; therefore conflict prevention, abatement 
and resolution are paramount if the costs of dealing with state failure are to be avoided. 
Hence, both developmental and security considerations necessitate conflict prevention via 
human development and poverty reduction. In practice, however, it is difficult to separate 
the development and security agendas. During the Second World War, President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt enunciated four fundamental freedoms in 1941. Among these were the 
freedom from want and the freedom from fear. The former may be regarded as akin to 
human development, and when we combine it with the freedom from fear it helps shape 
our notion of human security. Once again, these two freedoms are inextricably 
intertwined, because without security ensuring livelihoods is meaningless, the converse is 
equally true. In policy terms, for example, the reduction of absolute poverty, connected 
with the millennium development goal (MDGs), yields a double dividend by 
simultaneously addressing security and developmental concerns.  
 
In the past three decades, and particularly since the end of the cold war, there appears to 
be a greater incidence of developmental failure and in the extreme form state failure, 
which sometimes leads to violent conflict. Related to these phenomena are the functions 
of the state. Is the state benevolent or predatory? A great deal has been written on this
5
, 
but what is salient is that we are increasingly regarding the innate nature of the state in 
developing countries as factional or predatory. We seem to have left behind us the idea 
that the state should be a functionary agent of society. Even within the predatory category 
there are shades of grey associated with good, moderate or bad governance. In many 
ways, these distinctions among states mirror Olson’s (1996) stationary and roving bandit 
dichotomy. A stationary bandit (state) nurtures the tax base (society) so that more can be 
extracted in the future, a roving bandit is only bent on what is extractable here and now.   
 
One robust result in the empirical cross-country civil war literature is that per-capita 
income and conflict risk are significantly and negatively correlated. Although this finding 
may disguise the mechanisms that truly underlie the statistical association, conflict risk is 
heavily associated with developmental and state failure. My contention is that both 
development failure, as well as rapid development (or growth) enhance conflict risk. 
Additionally, factors external to the nation state can also enhance conflict risk.  
 
With regard to development failure and conflict, two phenomena have been utilised to 
explain civil war onset among rational choice theorists: greed and grievance. According 
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 This includes the current belief that the long-run growth prospects of a nation are dependent on the quality 
of ‘institutions’; see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) for example.  
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to this view, conflict reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents, 
concealed with the fig leaf of collective grievance. Additionally, rebellions need to be 
financially viable: civil wars supported by natural resource based rents like blood 
diamonds or oil, or when sympathetic diasporas provide a ready source of finance, are 
more likely to occur. More recently, Paul Collier and his associates (2003) emphasise the 
poverty trap: poverty makes soldiering less unattractive as a livelihood strategy, lowering 
the opportunity cost of war in poor nations. In turn, conflict serves to perpetuate poverty 
because of war’s destructiveness; a vicious cycle of poverty-conflict-poverty ensues. 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) assert that ethnic or religious diversity makes little contribution 
to civil war risk, which are mainly caused by diminished state capacity in the context of 
poverty. This finding, taken together with Collier’s work has a simple intuitive appeal; 
civil wars occur in poverty stricken, failed states characterised by venal, corrupt and inept 
regimes, with the dynamics of war sustained by a motivation akin to banditry. It also 
provides the intellectual basis for direct, colonial style, intervention to in collapsed or 
failing states.  
 
But in many ways, these views go against the grain. There is a long-standing position that 
relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970) and the grievance that it produces fuels internal 
violence.
6
 Identity is also crucial to intra-state conflict. This is due to the collective action 
problem, as discussed in Olson (1965). It is difficult to mobilise large groups to undertake 
collective action, because of mutual mistrust, monitoring difficulties and the free-rider 
problem. Ethnic identities, whether based on race, language, religion, tribal affiliation or 
regional differences, may serve as a more effective amalgam for the purposes of group 
formation, compared to other forms of difference such as socioeconomic class. The 
formation of enduring identities are therefore central to mobilising groups, including the 
machinations of conflict entrepreneurs who organise men to fight each other. Conflict 
cannot proceed without the presence of palpably perceived group differences, or 
grievances, which may have historical dimensions. Frances Stewart (2000) has 
introduced the notion of horizontal inequality, the inequality between groups, rather than 
the inequality within an ethnically homogenous population (vertical inequality). Here 
more enduring (or hard to change) dimensions of inequality (Tilly, 1998) compared to 
relatively more transient causes of inequality (like current income) are crucial, such as the 
manner in which certain groups are discriminated against, simply because of their ethnic 
characteristics, rather than their other personal attributes.   
 
Ultimately, the greed and grievance motivations for conflict may actually be inseparable 
in the sense that even if one theory is better at better motivating the start of conflict, the 
other phenomenon is sure to follow. Thus, for example it is not uncommon for a conflict 
linked to palpable grievances to mutate into a situation where the rebels become greedy, 
and both greed and grievance can be seen to co-exist. It would appear that the greed 
explanation for conflict duration and secessionist wars works in large cross-country 
studies, but has to make way for grievance-based arguments in quantitative country-case 
studies. Grievances and horizontal inequalities may, after all, be better at explaining why 
conflicts begin, but not necessarily why they persist. Although the presence of either 
greed or grievance is necessary for the outbreak of violent conflict, they are not 
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sufficient. This requires institutional breakdown for peaceful conflict resolution, which 
may be described as the failure of the social contract (Murshed, 2002, 2010). 
 
The social contract refers to the mechanisms within society that resolve conflict without 
outright violence. It contains a moral, economic and political component both at national 
and local levels. It also implies a functional view of the state; governments exist to serve 
a purpose, and rule is by consent. Contemporary civil wars are more often related to the 
breakdown of explicit or implicit mechanisms to share power and resources, rather than 
the complete absence of an agreement to govern these. This is true even in the most 
extreme cases, such as in Somalia. Cold war rivalries and the interventions of external 
powers in the domestic affairs of other countries may also undermine an existing social 
contract. Among various factors, two domestic reasons leading to the decline of the social 
contract may be highlighted.  
 
The first point refers to the resource sharing agreements the state, or those in power, have 
with various stakeholders, and the breakdown of these arrangements that can produce 
greed and/or grievance. Within nation states, the fiscal system will secure a workable 
social contract if the allocation of public expenditures and the apportionment of taxes are 
judged to be fair, or at least not so unfair that some groups judge taking resources by 
force the better option. There are many examples of conflicts emerging out of fiscal 
disputes, particularly in the context of economic decline. Disputes over the 
apportionment of revenues from natural resources are especially common and, as in 
Nigeria these take on ethnic and regional dimensions. One reason that a contract to share 
revenues and resources encounters difficulties is the imperfect credibility with which the 
side that controls the 'pot' honour’s its commitment. This includes broad based public 
expenditure, fairer taxation, inclusion in government jobs and allowing potential rebel 
groups a share of locally generated resource rents. Also, the social contract is less likely 
with regimes that prefer repression over making transfers that assuage rebellion.  
 
Secondly, there is the political system. Hegre et. Al. (2001) point out that the risk of 
conflict is lower in both well established democracies and autocracies. It suggests that 
conflict risk is at its greatest during transitions to and away from democracy, when state 
capacity is weak, and also in fledgling and imperfect democracies (anocracies). This is 
when the violent expression of grievance is most likely. Autocracies are adept at 
suppressing dissent, and established democracies deal with the same problem in a more 
peaceful fashion. Also, state capacity (its ability to both police citizens and provide 
public goods) is greater in established autocratic or democratic societies, rather than in 
those somewhere in the middle. Thus, there may be an inverted u-shaped relation 
between democracy and internal conflict; increased democracy is first associated with 
rising violence, after a critical point in democratic achievement, conflict and violence 
diminish. In other words, democratic transitions may induce a greater risk of violence, 
unless managed well via systems of power sharing, and constraints on the executive. 
 
The functions of the state are important in maintaining the cohesiveness of society, which 
in turn is central to a functioning social contract. Besides its legitimate Weberian 
monopoly over violence, a functioning state must be able to enforce laws, property rights 
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and contracts, as well as have the fiscal capacity to raise revenues and provide public 
goods. Otherwise, a gulf appears between the de jure and de facto functions of the state 
diverge, which Ghani and Lockhart (2008) refer to as the sovereignty gap.  A modern 
state must also be able to provide a wider range of public goods (health, education for 
example), in addition to a capacity to regulate and manage markets. The list grows longer 
with economic progress; more affluent nations have bigger governments (measured by 
the share of government consumption in national income). Economic decline in ‘failing’ 
states severely undermines the state’s fiscal capacity, something which makes it heavily 
aid dependent, which further diminishes state capacity. Furthermore, a ‘failing’ state’s 
ability to guarantee personal security, property rights and laws is often limited, leading to 
the gradual privatisation of violence between predatory and defensive elements within 
society. All these circumstances combine to produce a degenerating social contract, 
where individuals rely on kinship based groups and local warlords for security and public 
good provision, heightening the risk of civil war as society descends towards an 
anarchical, Hobbesian state of nature.     
 
In developing countries deemed to be successes in terms of achieving economic growth 
and their participation in the globalized economy, economic progress can bring about its 
own conflictive tendencies in the form of riots, local rebellions and sporadic violent 
protest, even when the state is not fundamentally threatened by outright civil war. Some 
of these conflicts take the form of highly localized revolts in small pockets of the nation 
state, and may even escape serious international scrutiny, as the country as a whole is 
deemed to be making progress. Countries that are growth or human development 
successes in aggregate may still contain regions where extreme disadvantage and 
deprivation persist.  
 
Some of the world’s economic success stories, in terms of growth, are highly globalized 
in terms of their participation in international trade and financial flows. These countries, 
mainly in East Asia (and also India) have done well, but the cost has been greater 
inequality, particularly the widening gap between skilled and unskilled workers 
(Mamoon and Murshed, 2008), and the increased marginalization of informal sector 
workers and landless labourers. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) theory of trade 
informs us that after an expansion of trade, the factors of production engaged more 
intensively in the exportable sector will witness a rise in their remuneration. This is 
because the exportable sectors of the economy expand, and the import-competing sectors 
contract, after increased international trade. If there are factors of production, say certain 
types of workers, specific to the contracting sectors, many of these individuals will 
become part of the unemployed, unless they can re-equip themselves into newer 
occupations. It is immediately apparent that globalization produces winners and losers, 
and in many instances the losers from increased trade or globalization demand protection, 
failing which they might violently protest.  In the absence of counteracting policies this 
can encourage revolt, including violent protest that undermines development, even if it is 
not a serious challenge to state leading to state ‘failure’. For example, the commercial 
extraction of forestry and mineral resources in India, along with the historical 
marginalization of certain ethnicities, have fuelled Maoist insurgencies in that country.   
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Rodrik (1998) pointed out that in general more open economies tend to have bigger 
governments. The larger size of government relative to national income is predicated by 
the need for the state to provide a form of insurance or social safety net against the 
temporary adverse economic shocks that tend to strike at more open economies with 
greater frequency, some of which are purely external to the country. For example, the rise 
in global food and essential fuel prices sparked of revolts in many parts of the world, 
especially in food and fuel importing developing countries and may have even been 
partially responsible for the Arab Spring protests in 2011. By contrast, the Chinese 
government’s fiscal boost following the growth slowdown in the wake of the 2008 
recession may have staved off social unrest. Similarly, the achievement of 
macroeconomic stability may produce conflict. For example, international financial 
markets require the smooth servicing of a country’s external debt, but debt servicing may 
require belt tightening in terms of competitive devaluation (which raises the cost of 
imported food and fuel), as well as government spending cuts. This can lead to mass 
protest and riots, thus there is a trade-off between macroeconomic and political stability 
(Boyce, 2007).       
 
More generally, historical accounts suggest that in early stages of development violence 
and increasing prosperity initially go hand in hand, but decline thereafter, Bates (2001). 
Traditional societies may have rules and norms that manage violent behaviour, even 
making peaceful dispute settlement self-enforcing. An increase in prosperity may 
encourage predatory behaviour in the form of private violence by the less fortunate, or 
group violence if the collective action problem is resolved. Once growth progresses 
further, violence has to decline to sustain the security of investment, and the state has to 
perform regulatory and security provisioning functions. Increasing violence may be 
symptomatic of the return of privatised social violence, precipitated by frustration 
spawned by greater awareness in the midst of the lack of commensurate individual (rather 
than national) progress. Gurr’s (1970) notion of relative deprivation argues that when 
people perceive that they have less than their just deserts they will revolt.  This is more 
likely to occur when the general or average level of prosperity is increasing, but some 
groups are left behind, as is often the case following globalization led growth.  
Another issue that may produce violence in developing countries, but has received scant 
attention, is the growing inequality between richer and poorer nations of the world. 
Milanovic (2011) demonstrates that the growth effort required for poor countries to catch 
up, including that for fast growing emerging economies like India, is much greater than 
normally thought. Secondly, individual positions in a global income distribution are 
much more determined by domicile (the country where you work) rather than 
socioeconomic class or occupation. For example, the income inequality between two 
similarly qualified doctors working in Britain and Zimbabwe may be greater than the 
measured inequalities that exist within a single nation state. In an era of widespread 
informational dissemination about more affluent life styles, disparities between nations 
may encourage people disaffected by this global inequality of opportunity to revolt 
against their government’s failure to deliver a higher and fairer standard of living.7  
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3 Natural Resource Endowments and Civil War 
 
During the last decade, the fact that dependence on primary goods exports enhances 
conflict risk became one of the best known results in the rational choice literature in 
conflict studies. The presence of natural resource rents is said to lead to the greed 
motivation for conflict. The idea being that it is easier to purloin profits or rents 
associated with the production of natural resource based commodities. This result has 
been subjected to a great deal of scrutiny, and as a consequence has not emerged 
unscathed. The fact that this simple assertion, based on a non-robust statistical 
association, needs to be nuanced is now widely accepted.    
 
Criticism of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) began with their definition of primary 
commodity to include both agricultural commodities and minerals/fuels, but which 
excluded illegal substances (coca and heroin) as well as illicit alluvial diamonds. Certain 
varieties of resources are more easily appropriated: they may be lootable such as alluvial 
diamonds (in Sierra Leone, Angola) available along river beds using artisanal techniques 
or illicit drugs such as coca in Colombia; obstructable like an oil pipe line; see Ross 
(2003) on these issues. Illicit gemstones and drugs are demonstrably more crucial to 
financing rogue conflict entrepreneurs in a greed based conflict; their omission is a 
serious flaw. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) do not differentiate different types of natural 
resources, such as between lootable and non-lootable natural resources and between 
point-source (mineral-fuel) and diffuse (agricultural) natural resources. It is arguably 
more difficult to ‘steal’ revenues from diffuse agricultural production, especially when it 
is a smallholder (and not plantation) based activity. Also one should not only be 
concerned with current and past production, neglecting future prospects for extraction. 
This means that the emphasis should be on the total stock of resources. In summary, the 
famous Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
8
 results about the importance of primary goods 
exports in enhancing conflict risk is not statistically robust; the results will not survive 
different measurements of natural resource abundance or dependence, as well as other 
changes in data definition, such as country inclusion/exclusion, periodicity and 
definitions of time periods (see Murshed, 2010, chapter 3 for a detailed review).  
 
Facing these challenges, Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2007) revisited their previous 
greed argument by stating that, 'the feasibility hypothesis proposes that where rebellion is 
feasible it will occur: motivation is indeterminate, being supplied by whatever agenda 
happens to be adopted by the first social entrepreneur to occupy the viable niche' (p. 21). 
If feasibility is about opportunity, greed is also about opportunity. The basic arguments 
and empirical evidence are much the same as before, and deeper motivations aside from 
criminal greed are ignored.      
 
The availability of lootable and obstructable resource rents may be a better explanation 
for the duration of civil war rather than its actual onset. Natural resource rents can by 
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themselves become a source of grievance leading to war and insurgency, if local 
populations feel that they are not getting their fair share, as in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria. It can also cause secessionist tendencies amongst relatively rich regions, who no 
longer want to subsidise their fellow countrymen, as in the case of Aceh in Indonesia.  
 
Along side the famous greed motivation for here is a large parallel literature on the 
resource curse, where it is argued that that the presence of substantial natural resource 
rents retards development through political economy channels. This has a bearing on 
resource rents as a potential driver of civil war, as civil war is one (violent) form of 
competition over the prize for the right to control resource rents. In a nutshell, the 
negative effects of resource rents from a political economy perspective arise when it 
leads to rent seeking and corruption which has a destructive effect on normal productive 
investment and hence growth.  
 
For example, Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) find that natural resource abundance 
has adverse effects only in the presence of poor institutions. They do not, however, take 
into account the potential reverse or bi-directional causality between institutional quality 
and growth. Simple-minded institutional theories which suggest that the presence or 
absence of the resource curse depends on the quality of institutions ignore the 
complexities of the incentives that are presented to political leaders, because in certain 
circumstances they may choose unenlightened rent seeking policies that suit them and a 
narrow interest group, and in a different environment they could decide to be more 
benevolent; see Murshed (2010, chapter 2). There is also the further possibility that they 
may deliberately undermine already existing institutions and/or institutional 
development, so as to further their own ends. When it comes to the empirical examination 
of these phenomena, the distinction between the harm caused by malfunctioning 
institutions already present, and bad institutions engendered by resource rents can 
become observationally indistinguishable.    
 
A related question is what we precisely mean by institutions. In the literature under 
review here, they pertain to the measured quality of governance, and sometimes to the 
nature of the political system (democracy, autocracy, anocracy, presidential/prime 
ministerial systems, constraints on the executive). All of these phenomena are 
numerically measured in various data sets that code and rank institutional quality.  
 
Mavrotas, Murshed and Torres (2011) demonstrate that both point-source and diffuse 
type natural resource endowments retard the development of democracy and good 
governance, which in turn hampers economic growth. So there is a more widespread 
resource curse, valid for both endowment types. Point sourced economies have a worse 
impact on governance, and governance seems more important for growth compared to 
democracy. Manufacturing, and manufactured goods exports, do promote better 
governance and democracy. This in turn helps to explain the superior growth 
performance of manufactured goods exporting nations. Not only is the presence of 
manufactured exports an indication of a more diversified and growing economy, but this 
may be so because these countries have better institutions of governance and higher 
levels of democracy. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) reject previous arguments for 
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regarding natural resource wealth or dependence as the principal culprit for civil war. 
They speculate that resource dependence (a reliance on primary goods exports rather than 
simply having a lot of natural resources) may be a manifestation of the failure to grow 
and diversify as a consequence of conflict, but does not contribute directly to conflict.  
 
The above discussion refers to average outcomes in cross-country analyses of a large 
number of nations lumped together. On many occasions, detailed case studies can be 
more informative, particularly about the precise nature of incentives and complexities of 
institutional quality. With regard to the political economy of development strategies, 
Dunning (2005) analyses differing choices by rulers regarding the future growth path of 
the economy in the context of natural resource abundance. He compares Mobutu’s Zaire 
(1965-1997) to Suharto’s Indonesia (1965-98) and Botswana during the same period. In 
Botswana, revenues from Kimberlite (deep mine shaft) diamonds were very stable, due to 
Botswana’s unique relationship with the South African diamond company De Beers and 
its important position as a major supplier. It chose a developmental path because of the 
mature nature of political elites there. In Indonesia and Zaire resource flows were 
volatile. In one case the dictator (Suharto) chose diversification and growth enhancing 
strategies, as well as policies aimed at equalisation and poverty reduction to contain 
political opposition. In the other case (Zaire, now DRC), Mobutu did not, because he felt 
that diversification and investment in infrastructure would loosen his grip on power and 
strengthen political opposition to him based on ethnicity. Both Mobutu and Suharto, in 
particular, owed their existence, at least initially, to the patronage of the USA and 
Western powers. Perhaps, in East Asia a more palpable fear of communism (with a large 
country, communist China in the neighbourhood) strengthened developmental goals in 
dictators, whereas in Africa factionalism dominated policy making and politics, retarding 
growth enhancing economic diversification and infrastructural development. 
 
Another strand of the literature builds on the link between inequality and resource 
endowment of the point-sourced variety; see the work of Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), 
who discuss the historical experience of Latin America.  Commodity endowments of the 
point-source variety (commodities that are mineral, fuel or plantantion based) tend to 
depress the middle-class share of income in favour of elites, as in Latin America. The 
idea being that these elites, in turn use their power, identical with the forces of the state, 
to coerce and extract rents. When different groups compete with another for these rents, 
the rent-seeking contest leads to even more perverse and wasteful outcomes than when 
elites collude. 
 
In short, both the simple minded greed theories based on purely criminal motivations, and 
naive institutional fundamentalism in relation to natural resource rents and conflict risk 
need a great deal of nuancing to the individual case under scrutiny, so that the 
mechanisms that lie in the middle of natural resource rents becoming conflict risk 
enhancing are properly understood. Among the many factors to be considered are the 
type of natural resource, measurements of their abundance or the economy’s dependence 
on them, variation in the quality of political institutions, the incentives of rulers and the 
ruling class, and whether rulers deliberately undermine existing institutions to facilitate 
their kleptocratic ends.  
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A final important dimension missing from the literature on natural resources and conflict 
is individual motivation to participate or refrain from joining rebellion or violent contests 
over resource rents. This problem is usually brushed under the carpet, even by those 
constructing theoretical (mathematical) models of resource driven conflict, by stating that 
the conflict entrepreneur must satisfy the participation constraints of his soldiers (usually 
by allowing them to loot). Indeed, many studies have indicated that participation in 
violence is motivated by the lack of alternative employment opportunities and the lack of 
human capital (education) with which to make a living. In addition to these extrinsic or 
pecuniary motivations, individuals are also be driven by intrinsic motivations, 
particularly group grievances. As previously indicated, identity may be salient to revolt 
and rebellion. An individual’s utility may be related to his identity, specifically the 
relative position of the group he identifies himself with in the social pecking order; see 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000). An individual may derive utility from certain normative 
forms of behaviour appropriate to his identity but considered deviant by other groups, and 
may even face sanctions from like-minded group members if he deviates from them. 
Memories of historical injustices can play an important part in forming the group identity. 
This type of behavioural paradigm may be related to solving the collective action 
problems alluded to earlier, without which organised large-scale violence is impossible.  
 
4 Localized Conflict 
 
In conflict studies at present there is a need to go beyond the results that emerge from 
‘averaging’ across the world’s conflicts typical of cross-national studies, where the cases 
are extremely heterogeneous because conflicts in different parts of the world are lumped 
together, to the analysis of conflict at the more homogenous sub-regional and sub-
national levels. The study of local conflicts is very much within the mode of the case 
study approach. The heterogeneous effects of conflict may extend to different areas of the 
same country, including between rural and urban areas, say. Therefore, more studies of 
the drivers and consequences of conflict at a more local level within nation states are 
required. Averages results that are determined from a cross-section of countries in 
various parts of the world, combining Latin America, Africa and Asia, may disguise what 
is salient to an individual conflict in a region within a country. It is also often misleading, 
leading to one size fits all type of policy prescriptions that can backfire. For example, 
environmental conflict between different groups over land, access to water and other 
natural resource based production inputs, yield different results when studied locally, and 
when analyzed in a large N-country cross-sectional analysis. Environmental factors as a 
source of conflict are found more significant in local case studies, whereas its importance 
diminishes when examined through the prism of a cross-country analysis.  Moreover, in 
many large developing countries systematic internal conflict is highly localized and 
confined to a few small geographical regions. These do not necessarily seriously 
undermine the central authority of the state, but continue to retard human development in 
various pockets, even when the nation as a whole is making progress. The various Maoist 
insurgencies in India are a case in point.  
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A variety of methodologies can be employed to study local conflicts. One such technique 
is based on the analysis of household surveys. These are standard nowadays, and among 
other things are used to gauge information on household consumption, living standards, 
and other socio-economic information, including questions about identity. They are 
particularly useful in post-conflict settings in order to garner information on household 
coping strategies, livelihood investment decisions, as well as the salience of group 
identity based grievances in provoking future conflict. There have been calls for a more 
microeconomic approach to the study of conflict (Verwimp. Justino and Brück, 2009 for 
example), and this implies the study of conflict in particular localities. Another technique, 
used in geography, involves GIS mapping of conflict flashpoints and the exact location of 
contested natural resource endowments.   
 
Local level household surveys permit the gathering of information on aspects of cognitive 
psychology involving trauma and some of the tenets of behavioural economics in 
situations where there has been violence and conflict. This is important, as household 
preferences may not be exogenous but endogenous to previous experiences, including the 
trauma of conflict. For rural households and self-employed informal sector workers, 
consumption and production decisions are inseparable, because production and 
consumption are closely related. Therefore, these households are used to risky decisions 
and outlays. The presence of armed conflict can add new dimensions into these risks and 
uncertainties, also depending on the duration and intensity of the conflict, as well as 
perceptions about conflict re-emerging if it has stopped. Here prospect theory rather than 
expected utility may be more relevant following the traumas of war (Kahnemann and 
Tversky, 1979). Observed behaviour suggests that an uncertain prospect is often judged 
by the overall prospect of loss or gain rather than its strict pecuniary expected value; 
from positions of loss risk taking (rather than risk aversion) may be a more common 
psychological response.  
 
Prospect theory represents a departure from expected utility in that it is a two stage 
process, and risky ventures are weighted not just by (subjective) probability of the 
different risky states, but by a more complicated ‘decision weighting’ process. The first 
stage of the decision involves, an editing phase where a reference point is chosen to 
evaluate the likely effect of the actual risky investment framed in terms of specific 
aspects of the highly valued by the decision maker. In the second stage of evaluation, 
when the household decides on its type of investments, it may take more risks, if the risky 
project has a high enough decision weight compared to the less risky alternative. 
Decision weighting is related to the probability of an uncertain project bearing fruition, 
but it also includes the subjective desirability of the outcome, a property that alters less 
readily in the mind than the more objective probability of success. The point being that 
taking on more risks is understandable if there is a substantial chance that such 
investments will lead to recuperation of particular erstwhile losses. Consequently, a 
strong desire to retrieve a valued past state as a primary response to trauma and loss may 
occasionally lead to increased risk taking after experiences of violence. Clearly, there will 
some heterogeneity in individual responses to violence; not all traumatized individuals 
will become risk takers. Subjective perceptions regarding violence are endogenous to the 
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lingering effect of actual past experiences, and in decision making involving the future 
these perceptions may impact more on individual current preferences and choice. 
Individual households may not just be passively coping with the events around them, but 
could actively react to these events in order to re-shape their future.  
 
The points enumerated so far in this section so far pertain to individuals and households. 
But for the study of local conflict, the knowledge of local conditions also matters, and 
these will differ from national level averages and institutions. Local institutions that are 
of importance, are not the national quality of governance and democratic functioning, but 
local  politics and social capital, especially the extent of bridging social capital (if any) 
between antagonists in a local conflict. Furthermore, local economic conditions are 
crucial to the local conflict, and these include group inequalities, local poverty profiles, 
the abundance or scarcity of agricultural inputs (resources). Above all, what is salient to a 
local conflict is the whether different ethnicities compete over the same resource, or 
whether they participate in different complementary economic activities. For example, 
conflict risk is much greater when different ethnicities are engaged in the same activity 
say agriculture, than when one group are principally farmers, and the other retail traders.   
 
Another point of interest in the analysis of local conflict is decentralized governance, 
particularly fiscal federalism. Fiscal federalism leads to decentralized government 
expenditure decisions and/or revenue raising powers to sub-national entities. The revenue 
aspect may be important, particularly for regions with natural resources as in Indonesia or 
Nigeria, as it appeases local discontent about regionally generated revenues being 
siphoned off to central government. Other regional governments may be better able to 
raise local revenues, or even conduct their own borrowing. Decentralization may also 
increase the utility of regions that can take their own decisions about local public 
expenditure. It is important, therefore, to distinguish between the revenue and 
expenditure side of fiscal decentralization and its relation to conflict.  
 
On the expenditure side, a citizen is normally indifferent to which layer of government 
provides public goods, as long as provision is adequate. Citizens may care about the type 
of provision in some instances, say about what languages are taught in school, which 
might vary over different education authorities. Nevertheless, expenditure priorities are 
subject to political processes. Then, it may matter which executive authority (regional or 
national) or what legislature (regional or national) decides on spending priorities. Related 
to this is the theory of club goods. As the name suggests, club goods are excludable and 
voluntary. Only members can benefit from the club good, and membership is voluntary. 
As with a public good, members of a club do share, so the rule for the optimal provision 
for public goods also applies. The important point here is that many government services 
are closer to the characteristics of club goods compared to pure public goods, particularly 
at the local level. Furthermore, an outcome closer to the club goods optimum may be 
achieved with greater local control over public expenditure. Since this implies volition, it 
may be conflict reducing. 
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Badly conceived fiscal federalism, or the failure to adapt federalist rules to new and 
emerging situations (such as natural resource discoveries or debt burdens) can exacerbate 
latent conflictual tendencies in federations. In countries where minorities are dispersed, 
other forms of functional federalism or power dividing mechanisms are necessary in 
addition to fiscal federalism. Fiscal decentralization might work better in middle income 
countries with greater revenues to spend on public goods, and in countries where resource 
rich regions demand financial autonomy. Indeed, Tranchant (2008) empirically 
demonstrates that fiscal federalism is more successful at reducing conflict risk in 
countries with superior institutions using the international country risk guide (ICRG) 
data, implying that better institutional quality means the country has superior governance, 
and more durable political institutions. In particular, nations with malfunctioning 
institutions often have weak central governments, which encourages violent challenges 
and fiscal decentralization may fail to mollify potential rebels. 
 
5 Sectarian and Civilizational Conflict 
 
Rational choice approaches to conflict mainly focus on the material (economic, political) 
basis for conflict, as well as its material effects on society. There is relatively less on 
intrinsic and identity based motivations for conflict---a group cause based on identity that 
individuals identify with and can fight for. One reason for this is rational choice 
approaches often ignore history, concentrating on more immediate circumstances. 
Secondly, there is relatively less literature originating from the economics discipline on 
two forms of low intensity violence: civilizational or cultural conflict and sectarian 
violence. Perhaps, this is because neither truly undermines the existence of the state. In 
sectarian conflict the focus should be on individual choices to join or refrain from 
violence, rather than collective or group choices, as these modes of sectarian/ethnic 
conflict are relatively less pre-meditated.  
 
Civilizational conflict refers to a conflict between different ways of life. In present-day 
Europe, for example, there is a fear of Islam, in the shape of Muslim migrants in Europe 
(25 million Muslims reside in the European Union); both in the sense of annoyance with 
Muslim practices, and the potential dangers from home grown terrorism (Madrid train 
bombings, the London bombings, the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam, rioting by 
Muslim youths in Parisian suburbs). Certain segments of the Muslim immigrant 
population have developed a corresponding hatred for the West. Terror and migration (to 
the West) are said to be the two weapons in the militant Muslim’s armoury. This may 
bring about a ‘clash of civilizations’ in Europe.   
 
There can be two explanations for civilizational or cultural conflicts between Islam and 
the West. One is the inevitable clash of civilizations theory, as outlined by Huntington 
(1996). The hatred for the West by some Muslim groups is treated as given, and conflict 
with the West necessarily follows. The problem with these ‘culturalist’ views is that it 
treats culture as monolithic, and individual identity as a singular phenomenon, ignoring 
the multiplicity of identities that individuals may possibly possess (Sen, 2008). Thus, it is 
conceivable to be simultaneously a Muslim, a European citizen, a believer in democracy, 
as well as someone who respects difference and human rights. Contemporary racism in 
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Europe is driven more by disdain for cultural identities such as Islam, rather than 
biologically based phenomenon, such as complexion, as was the case until the recent 
past. Racist messages that breed fear of minorities like Muslims can emanate from 
attention seeking politicians, who campaign on a single issue that scapegoat a particular 
group for all of society’s ills (crime, unemployment and so on). Continental Europe has 
seen the rise of anti-immigrant, especially anti-Muslim immigrant, political parties in 
Denmark, the Netherlands and elsewhere. According to surveys
9
, negative perceptions 
about Muslims among non-Muslims have grown: in 2008 52% in Spain, 50% in 
Germany, 38% in France and 23% in the UK felt negative about Muslims and Islam. The 
PEW world surveys indicate that dislike of Muslims in Europe is greater among the older 
and less educated segments of the population. The same survey indicates growth in the 
Muslim sense of identity amongst Muslims immigrants in Europe.          
 
The alternative view holds that radicalization or political Islam in Europe does not arise 
in a socio-economic vacuum, and disgruntled Muslim behaviour in Europe may lie in 
wider material, political and identity based disadvantage. Stewart (2009) has documented 
the systematic disadvantage that Muslim groups face in European countries and 
worldwide. These range from economic discrimination in terms of jobs and lower 
incomes to under representation in public life. This phenomenon may be described as the 
horizontal inequalities that Muslims suffer from in contemporary Europe. Muslim 
citizens in Europe are systematically poorer, suffer from greater unemployment 
(including severe employment discrimination in countries like France) and are less than 
proportionately represented in public life (Stewart, 2009), in addition to the opprobrium 
their cultural identity attracts. Thus, some of the more extreme forms of terrorism and 
even other non-violent acts, which make a statement of difference with the majority 
community such as the wearing of hijabs, may have as their root cause, both the 
collective sense of injury caused by the sufferings of Muslims globally (such as in 
Palestine, Iraq or Afghanistan)
10
, as well as the more palpable economic, political and 
social discrimination felt within the European states that they reside in. The paper by 
Murshed (2008) models this as the interaction between fear of Muslim minorities driven 
by the rhetorical hate messages from extremist European politicians, and the hatred felt 
by some Muslim migrants for Western civilization based on the social/economic 
discrimination they are subjected to, as well as other historical and contemporary global 
injustices. 
 
As far as civilizational conflict is concerned, excessive deterrence against potential 
dissidents may backfire. These include heavy handed policing and the proscription of 
Muslim practices. It may produce more militancy and swell the ranks of the disaffected, 
and increases the danger of both vandalism and terrorist violence.  Secondly, space needs 
to be created so that most Muslim migrants are able to merge their personal identities 
                                                 
9
 http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262  
10
 Galtung (1964) argues that in choosing foreign policy options there may be differences in opinion within 
any given society. There is a central opinion and a peripherial opinion. Muslim minorities residing in 
Europe may hold strong ‘peripherial’ opinions about policies towards the Palestinian question, Iraq and 
Afghanistan. More peaceful options, both in terms of domestic harmony, and foreign relations, should 
incorporate the periphery’s opinions.   
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within their adopted European homelands. This includes developing a personal 
imperative to be tolerant of difference. Integrationist policies that make it difficult to be 
both European and Muslim are bound to be self-defeating. Many of the perpetrators of 
the London bombings were well integrated second generation immigrants before 
becoming radicalized. Thirdly, economic discrimination, the enduring inequalities faced 
by Muslims in Europe, needs addressing. Otherwise policies of integration or 
assimilation are bound to fail. This requires a strengthening of equal opportunity policies 
and laws to deal with the systematic disadvantage, particularly in labour markets, faced 
by Muslims in Western Europe, as pointed out by Stewart (2009). Radicalization amongst 
Muslim minorities may be less significant in societies where they face less identity based 
inequality of opportunity, as in the USA or Canada.  
 
Sectarian violence between religious groups characterise several developing countries: 
Hindu-Muslim violence in India, Christian-Muslim violence in Indonesia and Nigeria. 
These are highly localized (as it is confined to certain regions of large countries), and 
does not undermine the state. The state itself is not a target of the violence, unlike in the 
case of civil war; only localized state functionaries are found to be actors in this form of 
violence. India has a longer history than either Nigeria or Indonesia in this regard. Brass 
(2003) points out that Hindu-Muslim sectarian violence (known as communal rioting in 
India) is not as spontaneous as we are led to believe, but is very much part of the political 
process in India, particularly the rise of Hindu fundamental parties in Indian politics in 
the post-Nehru era. He also feels that, since Muslims, are a regular target of these attacks, 
they should be more appropriately termed as pogroms rather than spontaneous rioting. 
The easing of sectarian conflict in developing countries requires poverty reduction and 
the stemming of the inequalities produced by economic globalization. Declining poverty 
raises the attractiveness of peaceful income, rather than the earnings related to loot and 
violence. The inequality produced by globalization produces richer sectarian individuals 
who fund communal causes, leaving it to their poorer brethren to enact the violence. 
Hence social safety nets and the public provision of health and education that combat 
poverty and lower inequality are important. Localized institutional functioning also needs 
addressing. This includes the often virulently sectarian outlook of local governments, 
such as the government of the Indian state of Gujrat. Furthermore, getting to know the 
“other” via more bridging social capital between communities is also important in 




In the last decade our understanding of the processes underlying mass violent internal 
conflict has progressed to incorporate a greater variety of economic, political and social 
factors as well as institutions of conflict management. Methodological differences 
remain, but analysts of conflict have achieved a degree of consensus that violent internal 
conflict is mainly brought about by relative deprivation and/or the competition over 
resources. These tendencies, however, can either be mitigated by good institutional 
structures of governance, or exacerbated by malfunctioning and degenerating institutions 
(the social contract). A well functioning social contract, manages potential conflict, and 
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discourages violent challenges to the state by non-state actors. There are also well known 
quantitative studies, covering all countries in the world, regarding the determinants of 
internal conflict. The general propositions that emerge are informative, stressing on the 
one hand the presence of opportunity and feasibility in forming rebel movements, as well 
as failing state capacity to restrain these tendencies. On the other hand, it has long been 
recognized that deprivation produces rebellion. This relates to the differences between 
what people have in terms of tangible socio-economic indicators (income, assets 
including land, access to common property resources, access to public services, education 
and health), and what they think are their just deserts. If they have less, they may be 
inclined to rebel. Furthermore, in the absence of corrective policies, this is more likely to 
cause conflict in more ethnically fragmented societies.  
 
Yet a variety of lacunae remain in conflict studies. First, and foremost is the complex 
relationship between development and economic progress and conflict risk. Both severe 
underdevelopment and rapid economic progress can produce conflict risk. The former is 
associated more with the risk of civil war, the latter usually with mass violent protest and 
localised rebellion that does not fundamentally undermine the position of the state. 
Attention has to be focussed on the distributional consequences of growth. New sources 
of tension arise in our globalised world because of rising food and fuel prices which 
intensify existing grievances against the state, burdens of servicing international debt, and 
through the relative deprivation felt because of the ever widening gap in living standards 
between rich and poor countries. Secondly, we have the non-linear impact of increased 
democratisation on conflict risk. Mature democracies are peaceful, but democratic 
transitions enhance the chances of violent conflict. This means we have to have a 
nuanced take on the role of institutions, eschewing the naïve institutional fundamentalism 
that pervades the mainstream thinking about long-term development nowadays. Thirdly, 
greater emphasis has to be put on detailed case studies of local conflict. This means a 
deeper understanding of local economic conditions and social capital. Household surveys, 
if intelligently designed, can also yield deeper psychological insights on how the trauma 
of violence affects economic behaviour, as well as gauging the contribution of group 
identity and group grievances to any future conflict risk. The role of intrinsic motivation 
in joining movements, particularly the part played by an individual’s identification with 
the cause of a disadvantaged group that he belongs to deserves much more than the scant 
and passing attention that it has hitherto received in the rational choice literature on 
conflict. The study of sectarian (or communal) conflicts in countries such as India, 
Indonesia and Nigeria, as well as cultural conflict with Muslims in Europe deserves more 
sophisticated study. In the ultimate analysis, conflict resolution has always ubiquitously 
required justice, not just the justice that is in the interest of the stronger. In this 
connection a few words about the new liberal imperialism are in order, which for 
example favours regime change by direct action. Just as in the 19
th
 century the excuse of 
civilizing the backward is being increasingly used to justify direct intervention in 
developing country conflict. Despite the rhetoric, there is a great danger that these actions 
are much more in tune with the old imperialist objective of controlling the non-European 
world to the advantage of Europe (the present West), or at the very least in the spirit of 
colonialism’s misplaced ‘white man’s burden’ aim of civilizing the uncivilized; 
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